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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SURVEY
The majority of federal agency decisions reviewed by the Tenth Cir-
cuit during the survey period exhibited significant deference to agency
decision-making. Although judicial review of agency decision-making
was pervasive, deference to agency decisions permeated all areas of ad-
ministrative action. Part I of this Article examines the Tenth Circuit's
adherence to the Supreme Court's Chevron doctrine of deference to an
agency's interpretation of its own statute. Part II discusses the distinc-
tion between substantive and interpretive rulemaking. Part III discusses
the ability of administrative agencies to create rules through adjudicative
hearings, rather than informal rulemaking procedures under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.
I. DEFERENCE To AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS: WYOMING V. ALEXANDER
A. Background
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA),I numerous organic stat-
utes and the Supreme Court's non-delegation doctrine provide the basis
for judicial review of administrative decisions. 2 In devising the appro-
priate standard of review the APA does not address the level of defer-
ence accorded agency interpretation. Prior to 1984, the courts did not
take a consistent approach toward the issue of deference.3 Even the
Supreme Court seemed incapable of developing a consistent position.
Although one line of cases demonstrated deference to agency deci-
sions, 4 in a separate and equally distinct line of cases the Court con-
strued statutes and gave little or no deference to administrative agency
decisions.
5
Much of the uncertainty ended in 1984 with the Court's decision in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.6 Without ex-
plicitly overruling or disapproving of a single case, the Court defined the
level of deference the judiciary should grant administrative agencies
practicing rulemaking functions. In Chevron, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) defined the term "stationary source" in the Clean Air
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 - 706 (1988).
2. Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283,
307-08 (1986).
3. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969, 971 (1992); Claude T. Coffman,Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretations of Statutes,
6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 3 (1983).
4. See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 389
(1984); Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141 (1982); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965);
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
5. See Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982);Jewett v.
Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305 (1982); United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571 (1981); Morton
v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
6. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Act 7 to permit operators of polluting facilities to treat all polluting de-
vices as if they were in a single "bubble."18 The Natural Resources De-
fense Council (NRDC) and several other groups challenged the
"bubble" definition as contrary to earlier rulings of the EPA. 9 In invali-
dating the rule, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reasoned that the Clean Air Act did "not explicitly define
what Congress envisioned as a 'stationary source' "10 and that the legis-
lative history was "at best contradictory."" 1 The court then substituted
its own interpretation of the statute for that of the agency.'
2
On review, the Supreme Court reversed and set forth a two-step
framework for analyzing an agency's interpretation of a statute. First,
courts must determine whether "Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue."1 3 If Congress addressed the precise question
in an unambiguous fashion, the agency and the court have no choice but
to give full effect to the plain meaning of the statute. 14 Should the in-
tent of Congress be ambiguous, however, a court may only determine
"whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute."' 5 In devising the test, the Court relied on congressional
intent. An ambiguous statute, the Court reasoned, should be consid-
ered as an implicit legislative delegation to the administrative agency
giving it the discretion to decide which of several permissible interpreta-
tions of the statute to adopt. 16 Under Chevron there is no longer a sin-
gle, correct meaning on every point in a statute, and agencies are the
preferred gap fillers.17
Although the decision appeared to succinctly resolve much of the
confusion over agency deference, the Supreme Court's failure to con-
sistently utilize Chevron's two-step framework raised questions about its
precedential value.' 8 Likewise, an analysis of appellate court decisions
7. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1988).
8. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. This lenient definition of "stationary source" exempted
replacements of individual pieces of equipment from the EPA's standards so long as the
total emissions level of the facility did not increase above a certain level. Id.
9. Id. at 841.
10. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
i1. Id. at 726 n.39.
12. Relying on the "purposes of the non-attainment program" and two earlier deci-
sions, ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978) and Alabama Power Co. v.
Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the court of appeals found the bubble definition
inconsistent with the statute's purpose of ameliorating, rather than merely maintaining, air
quality. NRDC, 685 F.2d at 726-27.
13. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
14. Id. at 842-43.
15. Id. at 843.
16. Id. at 844.
17. With this newly devised two-step analysis, the Court concluded that the D.C. Cir-
cuit should not have addressed whether the "bubble" definition was inappropriate or in-
consistent with the policies underlying the statute. Id. at 845. Instead, the inquiry should
have been "whether the Administrator's view that it is appropriate in the context of this
particular program is a reasonable one." Id.
18. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 445-448 (1987) (limiting Chevron to
those situations where an agency must apply a legal standard to particular facts); Merrill,
supra note 3, at 981 (suggesting the Supreme Court has applied the Chevron framework to
626 [Vol. 70:4
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reveals a similar lack of consistency in following the Chevron frame-
work. 19 In its most recent term, the Tenth Circuit reviewed two admin-
istrative agency decisions and specifically addressed the question of
deference. 20 In both cases, the court applied the Chevron analysis in
reaching its decision.
B. Agency Action
In Wyoming v. Alexander 2 l the state sought review of the final deci-
sion of the United States Department of Education (DOE) requiring Wy-
oming to refund federal vocational education funds received under the
Vocational Education Act Amendment (VEA).22 The state obtained the
funds pursuant to a federal "grant-in-aid" for vocational education ad-
ministered by the DOE under the VEA,2 3 which allowed states to draw
from predetermined grants for local schools on an as-needed basis.24 A
key condition of the VEA, and the subject of the suit, was the require-
ment that Wyoming, as the receiving state, set-aside ten percent of the
total funds it utilized for handicapped students and twenty percent for
disadvantaged and non-English speaking students.
25
The DOE audited Wyoming's use of funds allocated under the VEA
in 1984 and found violations of the set-aside requirements. 2 6 Based
upon this report, the Assistant Secretary for Vocational and Adult Edu-
cation required the state to return $201,922.27 Although the state ad-
mitted to the misapplication of $16,363, it sought review of the Assistant
Secretary's ruling before the agency's Education Appeal Board (EAB).28
only half of the cases presenting questions of deference); Linda R. Hirshman, Postmodern
Jurisprudence And The Problem of Administrative Discretion, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 646, 688-703
(1988) (discussing the failure of Chevron to effectuate significant changes in the relation-
ship between courts and agencies).
19. See Continental Training Servs., Inc. v. Cavazos, 893 F.2d 877, 885-86 (7th Cir.
1990) (reiterating the Cardoza-Fonseca view that Chevron does not apply to every case involv-
ing agency deference); Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 824 F.2d 108, 113 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (statutory construction issues dictate courts use "traditional tools of statutory
construction to ascertain congressional intent"); UAW v. Brock, 816 F.2d 761, 765 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (courts need not defer to agency opinions on ambiguous statutory provisions if
the issues involve "a pure question of statutory construction"); Peter H. Schuck & E. Don-
ald Elliott, To The Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 984, 1040-41, 1059 (providing an analysis of decisions which have followed or di-
verged from the Chevron framework); see also Hon. Patricia M. Wald et al., The Contribution of
the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 530 (1988) (discussing the D.C.
Circuit's increased use of Cardoza-Fonseca).
20. In addition to Wyoming v. Alexander, 971 F.2d 531 (10th Cir. 1992), discussed
immediately below, the Tenth Circuit also addressed deference towards an agency in
Furr's/Bishop's Cafeterias, L.P. v. INS, 976 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir. 1992).
21. 971 F.2d 531 (10th Cir. 1992).
22. 20 U.S.C. §§ 2301 - 2471 (1988 & Supp. II 1992).
23. Alexander, 971 F.2d at 533.
24. Id. at 534. Pursuant to the VEA, Wyoming was allotted $1,110,314 in 1979 and
$1,062,848 in 1980. Of these funds, Wyoming withdrew all but $61,304 in 1979 and with-




28. Id. at 534-35.
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The EAB reviewed the Secretary's decision and, while finding some
rulings untenable, held DOE was entitled to a refund of $87,859 for
misapplication of funds.2 9 The Secretary of Education refused to alter
this decision and the state petitioned for review by the Tenth Circuit.30
C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
Wyoming did not dispute the facts, but did contest the calculation
of the refund. The state contended that the proper interpretation of the
set-aside requirement called for thirty percent of every dollar utilized to
be applied to the targeted student groups.3 ' Wyoming also argued that
thirty percent of any remaining, unspent funds at the end of the year
should be offset or "credited" against any shortages in the required ap-
plication to the targeted groups.
3 2
In contrast, the EAB interpreted the set-aside restriction to require
states to spend allocated funds only on targeted students until the mini-
mum per centum of the total grant was reached. 33 Only then could Wy-
oming spend the remaining funds on other approved, untargeted
student groups.
3 4
These two conflicting, although rational, interpretations of the set-
aside restriction resulted from the absence of express congressional lan-
guage on the question.3 5 In resolving the dispute, the Tenth Circuit
found no previous judicial interpretation of the statute.3 6 The court
found that, while sparse, the legislative history supported EAB's deci-
sion.3 7 The court specifically relied on: (1) the title to the VEA section
that read "National Priority Programs"; 3 8 (2) a Senate Committee state-
ment that "[t]hese particular set-asides were established to provide a
base amount each State must use for programs for students with special needs
. . .";s9 and (3) a Senate Committee statement that, "given the limited
amount of federal assistance available, it is the Committee's intent that scarce
dollars will be first devoted to those with greatest needs."' 40 Recognizing the
inconclusiveness of the statements, the court noted that "the rationale
supporting the EAB's initial decision is not as well developed as it might
29. Id. at 535.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 536-37 n.7.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 537.
34. Id. Technically, the order in which these funds were spent did not matter, but the
EAB's rationale directly affected the computation of the refund. In theory, the EAB's in-
terpretation held that if the total grant equaled $100 and at least $30 was spent on
targeted groups, how much more of the remaining $70 the state spent on any approved
program was not relevant. However, if the state spent only $80 in total, allocating thirty
percent, or $24 to targeted students, it had misapplied $6 and would be penalized accord-
ingly. The EAB's interpretation accounted for fines totaling $25,633 more than the inter-
pretation Wyoming asked the court to accept. Id.
35. See e.g., S. REP. NO. 882, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976).
36. Alexander, 971 F.2d at 537 n.9.
37. Id.
38. Id. (emphasis in original case) (referencing 20 U.S.C. § 2310 (1988)).
39. Id. (emphasis in original case) (referencing S. REP. No. 882, supra note 40, at 57).




Aside from the legislative history, the court acknowledged that
Chevron dictated a "narrow and deferential" standard of review.
4 2
Although it upheld EAB's interpretation, the court expressed uncer-
tainty as to whether the interpretation was a permissible construction of
the VEA statute. The court acknowledged that, absent an unreasonable
agency interpretation of a statute, its own view of the proper equitable
outcome was irrelevant. 43 The court thus concluded "that the EAB ac-
ted within the intent of Congress by holding Wyoming liable for its fail-




The various circuit courts inconsistently apply the Chevron doc-
trine.4 5 Despite the court's uncertainty with the EAB's actions, the ap-
plication of the doctrine in Alexander illustrates the prevalence of Chevron
in the Tenth Circuit.
The court alluded that its own view of the best interpretation of the
statutory language was not the same as that adopted by the EAB. 46 The
court's statements that "[t]he EAB has made a reasonable interpretation
of the VEA, to which we must defer" 4 7 and that "[t]he EAB interpreta-
tion reasonably and permissibly comports with the apparent intent of
Congress" 4 8 may be a veiled indication that, in the court's eyes, the EAB
did not make the most correct reasonable interpretation. A court fol-
lowing the Chevron doctrine could just as easily have found the EAB's
interpretation an unreasonable construction of the statute. For exam-
ple, the court could have held the state unambiguously requires the in-
terpretation advanced by Wyoming and that, therefore, EAB's
interpretation was unreasonable. Such a finding would have justified re-
versing EAB's decision.
The rationale for a finding of an unreasonable construction of the
statute is supported by subsequent congressional action. Prior to 1985,
Congress did not specifically outline the process for calculating set-aside
refunds. 49 In 1988, however, Congress amended the statute prospec-
tively to address the specific issue presented in Alexander. The amend-
ment, as codified, holds that states misappropriating funds "shall be
required to return funds in an amount that is proportionate to the ex-
tent of the harm its violation caused to an identifiable Federal interest
associated with the program under which the recipient received the
41. Id. at 537.
42. Id. at 536.
43. Id. (citing Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 646 (1985)).
44. Id. at 536-37.
45. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 35-43.
47. Alexander, 971 F.2d at 539 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 537 (emphasis added).
49. Id. n.8.
6291993]
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award." 50 Wyoming's 1984 violation date precluded application of the
1988 amendment to this case. The purpose of the amendment was pre-
sumptively to rectify EAB interpretations that were inconsistent with
congressional intent or simply viewed by legislators as unfair or irra-
tional. Regardless of remedial congressional acts regarding the EAB,
Alexander illustrates the pervasiveness of the Chevron doctrine in the
Tenth Circuit.
II. SUBSTANTIVE V. INTERPRETIVE RULEMAKING: ROCKY MOUNTAIN
HELICOPTERS, INC. V. FAA
A. Background
In Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. FAA, 51 the Tenth Circuit had no
difficulty deciding whether a rule promulgated by an agency was sub-
stantive or interpretive. The court's ease in making this decision, how-
ever, should not downplay the confusion that often surrounds this
question and the important ramifications of interpretive rules on af-
fected parties.
In the Administrative Procedure Act, Congress recognized a differ-
ence between substantive and interpretive rules.5 2 Substantive rules are
those that create or change rights, duties or obligations. 53 Interpretive
rules, in contrast, simply explain and clarify existing laws. They repre-
sent an agency's statement of its construction of the rule. 54 Although
substantive rules, prior to adoption, require notice and comment proce-
dures defined by the APA, 55 interpretive rules do not.5 6 The notice and
comment requirement allows interested parties to express their views to
the agency and to influence the decision-making process. This require-
ment adds the "elements of openness, accountability, and legitimacy" to
the rulemaking process.
5 7
An interpretive rule requires only that the agency publish its deci-
sion in the Federal Register after adoption. 58 An interested party has no
right to participate in the decision-making process. The difference in
procedural approach between substantive and interpretive rules arises
out of practical necessity. Congressional delegation of the administra-
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1234b(a)(1) (1988).
51. Id.
52. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988). See also 2 KENNETH C. DAViS, Ar)MINiSTRATiVE LAW TREA-
TISE §§ 7.8-.13 (2d ed. 1978).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988); Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking And Regulatory
Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 383; PeterJ. Henning, An Analysis Of The General Statement Of
Policy Exception To Notice and Comment Procedures, 73 GEO. L.J. 1007, 1009 (1985).
54. Asimow, supra note 53, at 383; Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretive Rules With Legislative
Effect; An Analysis And A Proposal For Public Participation, 1986 DUKE L.J. 346, 346.
55. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) - (c) (1988).
56. The APA specifically exempts "interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or
rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1988).
57. Asimow, supra note 53, at 402; see Henning, supra note 53, at 1012.
58. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (1988).
630 [Vol. 70:4
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tion of statutes to agencies implicitly requires gap-filling measures. 59 In
theory, this interpretive power does not create difficulties for interested
parties because agency findings merely clarify existing law and unfavora-
ble interpretations can be challenged in court. 60 Under Chevron,6 1 both
types of rules receive equal deference 62 and, as a result, they often have
the same practical impact.63 Although not. legally binding on parties, an
interpretive rule generally represents the agency's final position, invok-
ing deference by the courts. 64 The importance of the distinction be-
tween substantive and interpretive rules arose last year in the Tenth
Circuit.
B. Agency Action
Rocky Mountain Helicopters operates an emergency medical evacu-
ation service on call both day and night.6 5 In 1989, Rocky Mountain
notified the FAA of its intent to use night vision enhancement devices
(night vision goggles) in its operations. 66 Night vision goggles are used
primarily in military operations. 6 7 The local Flight Standards District
Office (FSDO) of the FAA prohibited use of the goggles and notified
Rocky Mountain that its operations specifications would be amended ac-
cordingly. 68 Upon Rocky Mountain's protest, the FSDO reaffirmed its
position after consulting both regional and national FAA personnel. 69
Rocky Mountain submitted written arguments about the amendment but
contended that the FAA impaired its ability to respond by failing to be
specific about the grounds for the decision. 70 Rejecting the arguments,
the FSDO amended Rocky Mountain's operating specifications as
proposed.
7 l
In response, Rocky Mountain filed for reconsideration with the
59. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974); see also Asimow, supra note 53, at
385; Saunders, supra note 54, at 350.
60. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); Saunders, supra note 54, at
346 n.5.
61. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(see supra text accompanying notes 16-21 for reiteration of the Chevron test); Saunders,
supra note 54, at 356.
62. Asimow, supra note 53, at 389. The author states "[b]ecause both legislative and
interpretive rules frequently explain the meaning of language, there is no obvious way to
determine whether an agency with legislative rulemaking power has made 'new law' or
interpreted 'existing law.' " Id. at 394 (citation omitted). See also Note, A Functional Ap-
proach to the Applicability of Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act to Agency Statements of
Policy, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 430, 434-35 n.24 (1976); General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus,
742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (the distinction between interpretive and substantive
rules is "enshrouded in considerable smog"), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074 (1985).
63. Asimow, supra note 53, at 384.
64. Id. at 385. See also supra the text accompanying notes 7-20 discussing Chevron test
of deference to agency decisions.








DENVER UNIVERSITY LI W REVIEW
FAA's Director of Flight Standards Service, 72 asserting that the FAA had
violated the notice and comment requirement of the APA because the
amendment constituted substantive rulemaking. 73 Citing safety con-
cerns regarding night vision goggles, the Director denied Rocky Moun-
tain's request for reconsideration. 7 4 Rocky Mountain appealed the
decision.
C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit had to decide whether the FAA's rulemaking
procedure regarding Rocky Mountain Helicopters was substantive or, as
the FAA argued, interpretative and a "reasonable interpretation of...
existing statutes."' 75 Specifically, FAA argued that since the APA does
not require notice and comment procedures when an agency promul-
gates interpretive rules, it was under no duty to allow Rocky Mountain
the opportunity to contribute to the decision-making process. 7 6 Rocky
Mountain argued that it was entitled to the benefit of notice and com-
ment procedures because the FAA has substantive rulemaking
authority.
7 7
The Tenth Circuit utilized definitions of substantive versus inter-
pretive rulemaking drawn from its earlier holding in Knutzen v. Eben Ezer
Lutheran Housing Center.78 The court began its analysis by defining a sub-
stantive rule as one "promulgated pursuant to a direct delegation of leg-
islative power by Congress [that] changes existing law, policy, or
practice."'7 9 An interpretive rule is one which either is "made by an
agency having no authority to issue a substantive rule" 80 or, if issued by
an agency with the requisite authority to issue a substantive rule, "at-
tempts to clarify an existing rule but does not change existing law, pol-
icy, or practice." 8 1 The court noted, however, the existence of other
approaches: "whether [the] rule affects individual rights and obliga-
tions," 82 "whether [the] rule depends on a statute for substantive mean-
ing or is in itself substantive,"' 83 "whether [the] rule will create new law,
72. Id. FAA agency decisions may be appealed to the agency director. 14 C.F.R.
§ 135.17(d) (1992).
73. Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 971 F.2d at 546; see supra text accompanying notes 52-
57.
74. Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 971 F.2d at 546. The FAA based its decision on 14
C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (1989) prohibiting the careless or reckless operation of an aircraft, and
14 C.F.R. § 135.17(d) (1989) allowing the amendment of a licensee's operations specifica-




78. 815 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1987).
79. Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 971 F.2d at 546 (citing Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran
Hous. Ctr., 815 F.2d 1343, 1351 (10th Cir. 1987)).
80. Id. at 547.
81. Id. at 546-47.
82. Id. at 547 n.2 (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974)).
83. Id. (citing Rochna v. NTSB 929 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1991)).
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rights, or duties,"8 4 "whether [the] rule [is] issued in [the] form of an
explanation," 85 and "whether [the] rule has substantial impact on those
it affects."
'86
The court acknowledged the viability of Rocky Mountain's claim by
noting that the FAA's substantive rulemaking authority was "undis-
puted."' 87 Given the FAA's powers, the court reasoned that the "deter-
minative question here is whether prohibiting the use of night vision
goggles constitutes a change in existing law, policy, or practice."8 8
Rocky Mountain asserted that the FAA's determination changed ex-
isting law, policy, or practice since the FAA had not previously prohib-
ited the use of night vision goggles in civil aviation.8 9 Rocky Mountain
relied on the fact that, although night vision goggles were not previously
used in civil aviation, the FAA had not specifically prohibited them.90
Spending little time analyzing Rocky Mountain's rationale, however, the
court simply stated that "[n]ight vision goggles . . .have never been
allowed in civil aviation." 9 1 Surprisingly, this brief conclusive statement
comprised the court's entire rationale. The court thus held that the
FAA's actions did not change existing law, policy, or practice.
92
D. Analysis
Although it had little difficulty reaching a decision, the court ac-
knowledged that the confusion afflicted not only agencies and parties
affected by agency rulemaking, but also the courts. The court recog-
nized numerous variant styles of judicial determination of the substan-
tive-versus-interpretive question and noted that "[t]his lack of a uniform
approach may attest to the difficulty of the determination."
'93
The court's recognition of the confusion surrounding the determi-
nation of a rule's substantive or interpretive nature reflects the view that
"the distinction between the two types of rules is 'enshrouded in consid-
erable smog.' 94 Moreover, the APA provides no explicit solution.9 5
That substantive and interpretative rules often have the same practical
effect on the public compounds the problem. 96 The original justifica-
84. Id. (citing General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied 471 U.S. 1074 (1985)).
85. Id. (citing Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
86. Id. (citing 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.16 (2d ed.
1979)).
87. Id. at 547. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1348, 1421 (1988 & Supp. III 1992).




92. Id. The Tenth Circuit vacated the FAA's decision and remanded the case back to
FAA, however, for its failure to demonstrate that the factual findings underlying its inter-
pretation were supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 547-48.
93. Id. at 547 n.2; see supra text accompanying notes 85-89.
94. La Casa Del Convaleciente v. Sullivan, 965 F.2d 1175, 1177 (1st Cir. 1992) (quot-
ing General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied
471 U.S. 1074 (1985)).
95. Henning, supra note 53, at 1008.
96. Asimow, supra note 53, at 384.
1993]
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tion for allowing interpretive rulemaking-that it does not affect one's
rights, duties or obligations-is often a moot point. Since courts are
inclined to give deference to agency decisions, a challenge of an inter-
pretive rule, such as Rocky Mountain's, is likely to be fruitless.
The Tenth Circuit's deference to agency proclamations of a rule as
substantive or interpretive is unlikely to change in the future. The im-
position of notice and comment requirements on all rulemaking would
discourage agencies from making any interpretive rules. The argument
that the additional workload and costs and decreased efficiency would
encourage agencies to proceed only in an ad hoc manner is well rea-
soned.9 7 Although some interested parties will be detrimentally ex-
cluded from participation in agency decision-making, the overall
efficiency of interpretive rules and the expected undesirable agency re-
action to mandatory notice and comment requirements argues for the
continuance of interpretive rulemaking. The Tenth Circuit's brief analy-
sis in Rocky Mountain illustrates courts' continuing acceptance of inter-
pretive rules.
III. RULEMAKING THROUGH ADJUDICATION: NUNEz-PENA v. INS
A. Background
An administrative agency's ability to make rules flows from a con-
gressional delegation of legislative power.9 8 In the landmark 1947 rul-
ing SEC v. Chenery Corp. ,99 the Supreme Court held that a federal
administrative agency may announce new rules of law in an adjudicatory
hearing and apply those rules to the parties before it.l°° Chenery became
the first Supreme Court case to expressly validate the development of
rules in what resembled a common law approach.
Under the APA agencies make rules through either quasi-legislative
or adjudicatory procedures.' 0 ' The APA, however, does not provide
detailed guidelines for the specific use of either set of procedures. 102 In
Chenery, the Supreme Court held that the choice of utilizing rulemaking
or adjudicative procedures "lies primarily in the informed discretion of
the administrative agency. ' 10 3
Adjudicatory and quasi-legislative rules differ significantly. Quasi-
legislative rulemaking promulgates rules of "general or particular appli-
cability and future effect" 104 and requires an agency to follow notice and
97. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 48 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (agencies often have the choice of proceeding in an ad hoc manner or by issuing
policy statements); Asimow, supra note 53, at 386; Henning, supra note 53, at 1013; Saun-
ders, supra note 54, at 369.
98. Ron Beal, Ad Hoc Rulemaking In Texas: The Scope Of Judicial Review, 42 BAYLOR L.
REV. 459, 463 (1990).
99. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
100. Id. at 202-04.
101. 5 U.S.C. § 553, 554 (1988).
102. Edward R. Leahy, Comment, Rule-Making And Adjudication In Administrative Policy
Making: NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 11 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 64, 69 (1969).
103. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 203.
104. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988).
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comment procedures. 105 Adjudicative procedures require an adversary
proceeding, including notice of the issues, responsive pleading, a hear-
ing and a decision. 10 6 Adjudicatory rules do not require notice and
comment procedures.' 0 7 Standing requirements and the lack of notice
and comment prohibit other interested parties from affecting the deci-
sion-making process. Theoretically, an adjudicative rule binds only the
parties to the action.' 0 8 Since agencies are likely to follow past deci-
sions in a stare decisis manner, however, these "adjudicative decisions
take on the status of rules."' 0 9 Although adjudicative rules are consid-
ered precedent without specific application to nonparty individuals,
"there will be many instances when compliance is expected without fur-
ther order."' " 0 Individual case decisions may create either narrow or
broad precedential effects. " I
Quasi-legislative rules have the force of law,' 12 while adjudicative
rules have the effect of precedent." 3 Agencies may use precedent to
distinguish, modify or overrule prior decisions."l 4 Subsequently, a non-
party to an agency hearing may be penalized for failing to comply with a
prior adjudicative rule.' 15 In 1992, the applicability of an adjudicative
rule to a nonparty arose in the Tenth Circuit.
105. Id. § 553(b) - (c); see supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
106. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Section 554 grants to private
parties the right to adjudication and outlines the required elements of notice to such hear-
ings and the opportunities for presentation provided to the parties. Section 556 outlines
government representation and the powers of agency employees at such hearings and as-
signs the burden of proof. Section 557 addresses initial decisions, agency review of deci-
sions and the record. Id.
107. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 745 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988) (discussing when ad hoc rulemaking is a justifiable exception to the general
requirement of notice and comment rulemaking); Ron Beal, Ad Hoc Rulemaking: Texas Style,
41 BAYLOR L. REV. 101, 128 (1989); Russell L. Weaver, Cheney I1: A Forty-Year Retrospective,
40 ADMIN. L. REV. 161, 167 (1988). The ability of agencies to create rules without notice
and comment procedures has evoked much criticism. See Arthur E. Bonfield, The Federal
APA And State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 297, 326-34 (1986); J. Skelly Wright, The
Courts And The Rulemaking Process: The Limits OfJudicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 376
(1974).
108. Leahy, supra note 102, at 71-72; Beal, supra note 98, at 464.
109. Weaver, supra note 107, at 200; see NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759,
765-66 (1969) (ad hoc rules serve as a guide for future agency decisions); Beal, supra note
101, at 464. But see, James C. Thomas, Statutory Construction When Legislation Is Viewed As A
Legal Institution, 3 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 191, 191-93 (1966).
110. Weaver, supra note 107 at 204; see Mehta v. INS, 574 F.2d 701, 705 (2d Cir. 1978)
(relief denied because petitioner should have been aware of previous agency decision and
responded accordingly); Saint Francis Memorial Hosp. v. United States, 648 F.2d 1305,
1311 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (previous agency interpretation of regulation applies to present case).
111. Weaver, supra note 107, at 200-01.
112. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695-96 (1974); Sims v. Heckler, 725 F.2d
1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 1984).
113. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 765-66 (1969); Ruangswang v. INS,
591 F.2d 39, 44 (9th Cir. 1978); American Mach. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1321, 1329-30
(5th Cir. 1970).
114. Weaver, supra note 107, at 202-03; Beal, supra note 98, at 464.
115. Weaver, supra note 107, at 202-03.
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B. Facts: Nunez-Pena v. INS 116
In 1987 Ruben Nunez-Pena, a resident alien of the United States,
was convicted of illegally using a telephone for drug trafficking and falsi-
fying tax returns to hide drug profits.'" He was paroled after serving
almost two years in prison."i8 The Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice (INS) moved to deport Nunez-Pena. 119 Found deportable by an
immigration judge, his application for waiver of deportation was de-
nied.120 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reviewed the peti-
tioner's claim under section 212(c) of the Immigration and
Nationalization Act (INA).121 Pursuant to this section, the BIA balanced
"'the adverse factors evidencing an alien's undesirability as a perma-
nent resident with the social and humane considerations presented in
his behalf.' "122 The BIA required the petitioner to " 'introduce addi-
tional offsetting favorable evidence, which in some cases may have to
involve unusual or outstanding equities,' " in support of his petition to
remain in the United States. 123 The BIA affirmed the INS decision or-
dering Nunez-Pena deported.'
24
C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
Nunez-Pena argued that the BIA improperly required him to meet
the "unusual or outstanding equities" test.' 25 Normally, the BIA bases
its deportability decision on a balance between the alien's undesirability
as a resident and the humanistic hardships of deportation.126 The BIA
also uses the unusual or outstanding equities test in cases involving seri-
ous criminal acts. 12 7 Nunez-Pena claimed he was not subject to the out-
standing equities rule because the INS had devised it through
adjudication and not rulemaking. 128 The court acknowledged that,
although other circuits had recognized the outstanding equities princi-
ple,129 the precise argument had not been previously considered.'
30
The Tenth Circuit, by deferring to the agency's application of the
outstanding equities rule, upheld the use of adjudicative rules by the
116. 956 F.2d 223 (10th Cir. 1992).
117. Id. at 224.
118. Id.
119. Id. The INS acted pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(1 1) (1988).
120. Nunez-Pena, 956 F.2d at 224.
121. Id. at 225. This portion of the INA has been utilized for both exclusion and depor-
tation proceedings. Id.
122. Id. (quoting In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584 (BIA 1978) (interim dec.)).
123. Id. (quoting In re Buscemi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 628, 633 (BIA 1988) (interim dec.)).
124. Id. at 224.




129. See Cordoba-Chaves v. INS, 946 F.2d 1244, 1246-47 (7th Cir. 1991); Blackwood
v. INS, 803 F.2d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 1986).
130. Nunez-Pena, 956 F.2d at 225.
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INS. The court reiterated the Chenery 131 holding that an agency has the
discretion to proceed by general quasi-legislative rule or by individual
ad hoc rulemaking through adjudication.13 2 Additionally, the court
noted that " '[a]djudicated cases may and do.. . serve as vehicles for the
formulation of agency policies, which are applied and announced
therein.' -133 The court upheld the outstanding equities standard since
"[a]n agency 'is not precluded from asserting new principles in an adju-
dicative proceeding.' "34
The Tenth Circuit did note that the agency's use of adjudicative
rulemaking could violate an individual's rights where the INS added an
element to a regulation which had been specifically eliminated during
prior rulemaking, 13 5 or where undue hardship resulted to those relying
on previous rules when the INS had abruptly changed its rule.136 The
court reasoned that Nunez-Pena had adequate notice of the outstanding
equities standard since it had been formulated and applied in adjudica-
tions well before his petition.1
3 7
D. Analysis
Criticism of adjudicative rulemaking centers on the lack of public
participation in the rulemaking process and on the lack of notice of new
rules. Adjudicative proceedings, like their judicial counterparts, only
permit parties to the action to participate.' 38 This precludes other in-
terested parties, although affected by a new rule, from participating in
the decision-making process. The lack of a requirement for APA notice
and comment procedures in adjudicative rulemaking insulates agencies
from public participation.
A party's lack of notice of what specific adjudicative precedent may
be applied to its particular case is troubling. Since adjudicative rules are
easily distinguished and amended, a party may have difficulty preparing
their case since "black letter" law does not arise from adjudicative pre-
cedent.' 3 9 Subsequently, a party to an adjudicative hearing may find
itself in violation of an amended rule that previously did not encompass
its operations.
Judicial review of agency action also encourages agencies to use ad-
131. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); see supra text accompanying notes 98-
103.
132. Nunez-Pena, 956 F.2d at 225. The Tenth Circuit has generally followed Chenery.
See, Nevada Power Co. v. Watt, 711 F.2d 913, 927 (10th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. American
Can Co., 658 F.2d 746, 758 (10th Cir. 1981). But see First Bancorp v. Board of Governors,
728 F.2d 434, 438 (10th Cir. 1984).
133. Nunez-Pena, 956 F.2d at 225 (quoting NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. 759, 765
(1969)).
134. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974)).
135. Id. (referring to Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 1980)).
136. Id. (referring to Ruangswang v. INS, 591 F.2d 39, 43-44 (9th Cir. 1978)).
137. Id.
138. Weaver, supra note 107, at 165. See generally NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394
U.S. 759 (1969) (agencies should balance the positive and negative attributes of quasi-
legislation and adjudication in selecting a decision-making process).
139. Beal, supra note 98, at 473.
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judicative rulemaking. Agencies find that: (1) rules promulgated
through quasi-legislative procedures are more susceptible to judicial
scrutiny; (2) adjudicative rules can be amended or overruled more easily,.
than quasi-legislative rules; and (3) adjudicative rules can be retroactive
in application.14 0 Simply stated, adjudication offers a safer means of
rulemaking for an agency.
The Tenth Circuit, or any other court for that matter, is unlikely to
restrict application of adjudicative rules, notwithstanding the criticism
aimed at the rules. Ad hoc rulemaking allows flexibility, responsiveness
and creativity in solving the daily intricacies of administration. The
drafters of quasi-legislative rules cannot practically anticipate all possi-
ble circumstances. Ambiguity and vagueness in statutes allows agencies
to mold decisions under varying circumstances to effectuate fairness.
The Supreme Court has stated that "not every principle essential to the
effective administration of a statute can or should be cast immediately
into the mold of a general rule. Some principles must await their own
development, while others must be adjusted to meet particular, unfore-
seeable situations."'' 1 Nunez-Pena illustrates the Tenth Circuit's defer-
ence to an agency's choice of rulemaking procedures and the force of
law given to adjudicative rules.
IV. CONCLUSION
During 1992, the Tenth Circuit favored judicial review of adminis-
trative agency decision-making. Although judicial review provided
checks against agency discretion, deference to agency decision-making
dominated. This deference permeated all areas of administrative deci-
sion-making, including an agency's interpretation of its own statute, an
agency's determination of whether it was creating substantive law or
simply interpreting it and the relatively unfettered ability of agencies to
create rules through adjudicative hearings.
John C. Haas
140. Leahy, supra note 102, at 75.
141. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
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